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Abstract 
This article analyzes the management of European Union (EU) business by the Irish 
core executive.  More specifically, it investigates the demands placed by EU 
membership on the Irish system of public administration and how the system has 
responded to these demands.  Employing an institutionalist analytical framework, the 
article maps the formal and informal organisational and procedural devices or 
structures used to manage EU affairs in Ireland, as well as dissecting the key 
relationships that govern this management process and the role of the domestic agents 
actively involved in the EU’s governance structure, the cadre or boundary managers.  
The article also explores in a dynamic way the development of the capacity for the 
management of EU affairs in Ireland over time. Using the concepts of path 
dependency and critical junctures, we illuminate how key system-management 
decisions became locked-in over time and we isolate the triggers for significant 
adaptational change, be they domestic or external.  Adaptation to EU business in 
Ireland was path-dependent and consisted of gradual incremental adjustment.  This 
system of flexible adaptation generally served Ireland well as the EU’s policy regime 
expanded and evolved, but in response to the shock rejection of the Nice Treaty by the 
electorate in 2001, significant formalisation of the Irish system occurred with the 
establishment of new processes and rules for managing relations between the core 
executive and the EU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, an 
additional layer of governance was added to its domestic system of policy-making, 
posing a challenge its national political and administrative systems.  The national core 
executive, that is, the Irish government and central administration or bureaucracy 
became a dominant carrier of Europeanization, as the system was required to adjust to 
engagement with the EU’s system of collective governance (Featherstone and 
Radaelli 2003, p.334).  Public policy-making was no longer to be conducted within 
the confines of the structures and processes of Irish government as EU policy making 
triggered institutional adaptation ‘at home’ and altered domestic rules (Wessels et.al. 
2003, p.14).  Adaptation to this system required more than just a once-off adjustment 
as the EU policy regime itself expanded and evolved over time.  The Irish core 
executive became the key nodal point and bridge between the national and the 
European in the EU’s networked system of governance, with members of government 
and senior civil service officials, the cadre or boundary managers, acting as 
translators of EU policies, norms and practices into the domestic arena and projecting 
domestic preferences back into the EU arena (Bulmer and Burch 1990, 2000 and 
2001; Genschel 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003).  Managing this additional 
layer of governance thus became increasingly important to the Irish core executive.  
So how does the Irish core executive manage EU business at home and in Brussels?  
Has the Irish public administration system developed the capacity to act effectively at 
the EU level?  How has the system of domestic management of EU business evolved 
over time?  This article investigates the adaptation and change of the Irish core 
executive to EU membership from an institutionalist perspective.  Focusing on 
organisational and formal and informal institutional configurations, the article 
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examines the demands placed by EU membership on the Irish core executive system 
and how the system has responded to those demands.1  Institutionalist concepts such 
as critical junctures and path dependency are also used to analyze in a dynamic way 
the changes over time to the core executive.  In examining the effect of the EU on the 
Irish national core executive, therefore, this article provides the most detailed 
mapping and analysis of how EU business is managed in Ireland heretofore. 
 
I.  EXECUTIVE ADAPTATION TO EU MEMBERSHIP 
During the 1990s, a growing body of research developed on the theme of 
Europeanization, a term used to denote the impact of the EU on the domestic.  EU 
scholars turned away from looking at the process of EU institution building to a more 
variegated examination of the effects of EU membership on member states 
themselves, be it affecting their politics, policy and polity (See Adshead 2005; Bulmer 
and Lequesne, 2005, p.13).  One of the earliest definitions of Europeanization defined 
it as ‘an incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational 
logic of national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech 1994, p.69).  One key strand of 
Europeanization research focused on how member state executives adapted to EU 
membership (Bulmer and Burch 1998, 2000, 2001; Kassim 2003; Wessels et.al. 2003; 
Goetz 1999).  Core executive adaptation is one of the five faces of Europeanisation 
identified by Olsen (Olsen 2002).  One of the earliest premises of such work was that 
the adaptation does not strictly have to be one way: member states are not just passive 
recipients of EU policies and programmes.  In a ‘loop’ of adaptation, they actively 
participate in shaping outcomes in Brussels and mediate what comes from the EU 
through national political and administrative institutions and processes (Wessels et.al. 
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2003, p.7; Bulmer and Burch 2001).  National executives are key ‘translator’ devices’ 
between the European and the domestic (Genschel 2001, p.98).   
 
The substantive focus of this part of the literature has been on the formal 
organizational changes that membership has brought and the manner in which 
national governments respond to engagement with the Union.  Historical 
institutionalism (HI) has been the preferred framework in a number of studies, notably 
Bulmer and Burch (1998, 2000, 2001), Harmsen (1999), Kassim (2003) and Laffan 
(2003).  With HI, the focus is on mapping the para-constitutional, organisational and 
institutional configurations and the coordination processes within domestic systems 
over time rather than analysing particular institutions in isolation (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002, p.693; Wessels et.al. 2003).  While the impact of the EU on member 
states’ politics has been found to be great, the effect on their governmental systems 
has been far less evident (Bulmer and Burch 2001, p.75; Knill 2001).  Managing EU 
business has not been a source of transformative change in national core executives.  
Adaptation is deeply rooted in national style.  Existing structures and operating 
procedures have been adapted around the edges rather than fundamentally altered by 
EU membership, as we shall see is the case in Ireland.  Nor have convergent patterns 
of national adaptation emerged (Wessels et.al. 2003).2  
 
Analytical Framework 
The notion of the core executive was developed in research on central government in 
the UK and includes all those organizations and structures which primarily serve to 
pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within 
the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine 
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(Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Rhodes 2000). The core executive lies at the interface 
between the political and administrative arenas involving a ‘highly institutionalised 
set of relationships’ (Smith 2000, p.29).  Yet the concept of the core executive does 
not just capture formal structures – cabinet and ministries – but also the more informal 
roles, networks and relationships between actors at the heart of government, be it 
politicians or senior officials.  The Irish core executive and system of government has 
been categorised as a variant of the Westminster model with one important difference 
– a written constitution (See Gallagher, Laver, Mair 2001).  The key conventions of 
collective and ministerial responsibility lie at the heart of the Irish Constitution and 
political authority is invested in the Government, which meets in Cabinet.  The Irish 
core executive consists of the Prime Minister, the Government, ministries known as 
departments (corresponding to all main areas of policy) and the civil or administrative 
service.  The 1937 Constitution places the Taoiseach, Prime Minister, in a powerful 
position as head of the government with the authority to hire and fire ministers.  
 
As mentioned above, the framework that guides our mapping of EU management by 
the Irish core executive is based on an institutionalist perspective, particularly 
historical institutionalism.  With HI, attention is paid to the configuration of political 
order around formal institutions, organizations, norms, rules, roles and practices 
which frame the conduct and strategies of actors over time (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992, p.2; Harmsen 1999; Bulmer and Burch 2001; Kassim et.al. 2001).    In their 
study of core executive management of EU business in Britain, Bulmer and Burch 
divided their organisational field as follows: the formal institutional structure, 
processes and procedures, codes and guidelines, and the cultural dimension (Bulmer 
and Burch 1998).  This was later adapted to focus on four institutional dimensions, 
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notably the systemic, organizational, procedural and regulative (Bulmer and Burch 
2000, p.50).  The analytical framework used here builds on and adapts Bulmer and 
Burch’s institutionalist framework by dividing the institutional field into three levels, 
analyzing not just the structural and process dimension of core executive 
management, but also the key role of agents.  The structural component maps the 
organizations and structures that form the core executive in Ireland and the key 
relationships in the management of EU affairs over time.  Was EU business absorbed 
into existing organizations or did it lead to major institutional innovation?  The 
process component examines the pathways for EU related information through the 
Irish domestic system and the codes, rules, guidelines that govern the handling of EU 
business over time.  How is EU business that is cross-cutting in nature coordinated in 
the Irish system?  The third component, the agents, examines the role of the 
individuals who act as the boundary managers or gatekeepers between the domestic 
and the European.  In all member states, there are a number of key political roles held 
by individuals who have primary responsibility for managing European affairs.  An 
administrative cadre (which includes senior civil service officials, the permanent 
representative) complements the political cadre (heads of government and key 
ministers).  Heretofore little has been known about the key attitudes, belief systems 
and values of such individuals (Wessels 2003, p.7).  
 
As well as helping us to identify various institutional configurations, HI also pays 
attention to institutional evolution and processes of change over time.  HI accounts of 
institutional change point to the ‘stickiness’ of institutions once established and the 
importance of path dependence in institutional development (Pierson and Skocpol 
2002, pp.696-703).  According to HI, the dynamic of change is path-dependent; once 
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created, institutions (be it structures, processes or roles of agents) may prove difficult 
and costly to change.  Change, when it does occur, e.g. the decision to alter the system 
of core executive management, can be either incremental (minor change around the 
edges) or episodic (Cortell and Peterson 1999, p.182).  Episodic change can be said to 
be related to what has been termed ‘critical junctures’ (Ikenberry 1988, p.16), 
described by Collier and Collier as ‘a period of significant change …which is 
hypothesised to produce distinct legacies’ (Collier and Collier 1991, p.29).  This 
episodic and significant change may result from events or processes internal and 
external to the domestic system.  Systemic change at the national level or political 
events at the national level that have a wide and significant impact may trigger the 
adoption of new modes of management.  At the same time, policy and regime change 
in the Union, such as through significant treaty reform, may also prompt further 
development of the domestic capacity for management of EU affairs  (Pierson 2000a, 
2000b; Scott, 2001).  Taking institutional evolution seriously enables us to track 
incremental change and path dependency, as well as to distinguish between internal 
and external sources of change, in particular enabling us to identify the effects of any 
critical junctures on the process of institutional development.  Adaptation to EU 
membership is seen as a continuous process punctuated by occasional critical 
junctures or moments.  The analysis of this change proceeds in the following manner.  
Section II analyzes the origins and development of the management of EU issues in 
Ireland, with the identification of triggers for significant change.  Section III dissects 
the structures established to manage the EU-domestic interface.  In sections IV and V 
the formal and informal coordination processes and the role of the agents or cadre 
managing these processes are examined. 
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II.  ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT OF EU 
ISSUES IN IRELAND 
From accession to the EU in 1973 to the end of the 1990s, Ireland’s system for 
managing EU business was relatively stable.  The structures and processes put in 
place on accession to position Ireland in the EU system appeared to work well over 
time and change, when it occurred, was incremental, slow and adaptive in response to 
developments at the EU level.  The expansion of the EU’s policy regime to include 
economic and monetary union, foreign and security policy and justice and home 
affairs in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union brought new domestic actors into 
the management system and increased the amount of EU business that had to be dealt 
with.  At the same time, a subtle shift occurred with the enhancement of the Prime 
Minister or Taoiseach’s position as overall guide and steer of Irish EU policy.  In 
2001, however, a domestic critical juncture occurred with the No vote to the Nice 
Treaty by the Irish electorate. The negative vote triggered a period of review and 
evaluation and resulted in significant change in how EU business was and is managed 
in Ireland.3 
 
Ireland’s approach to the management of its engagement with the EU was established 
in the latter half of the 1950s when the decision was taken by the then Prime Minister, 
Sean Lemass to consider joining the EEC.  From the outset, the mapping of Ireland’s 
European policy and the management of EU business was cross-cutting in nature, 
involving as it did a core of key senior officials from the main government 
departments.4  Moreover, the EEC was not a matter of foreign policy although the 
external dimension of the Union was clearly acknowledged.  The Prime Minister, 
senior domestic ministers and a small group of senior civil servants played the key 
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role in charting Ireland’s relationship with the system and in negotiating Irish EEC 
entry.  A Committee of Secretaries provided the forum for inter-ministerial discussion 
on the key issues and the Cabinet agreed the political framework within which the 
relationship would evolve.  The period between accession in January 1973 and the 
end of Ireland’s first Presidency in December 1975 were Ireland’s apprenticeship in 
the EU system.  During this period, the Irish Governmental system put in place 
structures and processes for managing the relationship with Brussels.  In its 
fundamentals the management system put in place remained unchanged until the late 
1980s.  Responsibility for day-to-day coordination on EU matters was assigned to the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the principle of the ‘lead department’ was 
firmly established.  In this way, individual departments as lead ministries became the 
domestic interlocutors with the EU and were responsible from the outset for 
coordinating preparations for Council meetings falling within their remit (Kassim 
2003, p.98).  Overall, there was very little institution building in the form of new 
structures, rather there was a reliance on the adaptation of existing domestic structures 
within the broad parameters of collective responsibility and ministerial responsibility.  
The Irish administration faced the challenge of adapting to the Brussels system with 
limited human resources.  There was a relatively small increase in full time non-
industrial civil servants as a result of EU membership.  The preparations for the 1975 
Presidency were important for Ireland’s adjustment to EU membership as the 
demands of running a Presidency ensured that departmental responsibility for 
different policy areas was clearly delineated and management of Council business 
meant that ministers and officials became familiar with the nuts and bolts of the 
Union’s policy process.  Indeed, the experience of the Presidency had an important 
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effect on the psychological environment of national policy makers: thereafter, the 
Union became an accepted albeit complicating factor in national decision making. 
 
The resurgence of integration at the EU level in the late 1980s and beyond prompted 
change in the Irish system.  Beginning with the signature of the Single European Act 
(SEA), the negotiation of the Delors I multi-annual budgetary package and the 
signature and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the amount of EU business to be 
dealt with increased dramatically.  New domestic players became involved in the EU 
game.  With the increased policy making in areas such as environment and internal 
security, the Departments of Environment and Justice moved from being peripheral 
actors to key departments involved in managing EU business and cross-cutting issues.  
The growing importance of the European Council in EU policy making enhanced the 
position of the Irish Taoiseach or Prime Minister in determining the broad contours of 
Ireland’s EU policy.  Under the premiership of Charles Haughey in particular (1987-
1991), the Taoiseach’s office adopted a stronger leadership role and played a key role 
in negotiating and implementing Ireland’s first national development plan using the 
increased structural funds gained from the Delors I package.  The hitherto moribund 
interdepartmental European Communities Committee was rejuvenated by the 
Taoiseach’s office under Haughey and chaired by a new Minister of State for 
European Affairs.  A high level committee of ministers and senior civil servants was 
also established and serviced by the Taoiseach’s office.  These committees were never 
fully formalised, however, and subsequently relied on prime ministerial will for their 
existence.  Finally, the dominance of the executive in the management of EU business 
weakened the already limited role of parliament in monitoring Irish EU policy and 
  11 
added to the process of deparliamentarization evident in political systems throughout 
Europe (Kassim 2003, p.91).   
 
The electorate’s decision to reject the Nice Treaty in 2001 shook the Irish core 
executive system for the management of EU business to its core.  Until 2001, Ireland 
managed to portray itself as a constructive player in the Union with a relatively 
communautaire approach in general.  The desire to be seen as broadly communautaire 
led successive Irish governments to go with the emerging EU consensus unless an 
issue was highly sensitive.5  The ‘no’ to Nice and the low turnout in the referendum 
(34 per cent) of the electorate highlighted the fact that the hitherto benign domestic 
environment towards the EU would not continue and the Government could no longer 
take its voters for granted.  Ireland’s European policy was loose of its moorings, 
which in turn led to considerable soul searching at official and political level of how 
EU business was managed and how Europe was communicated at national level.  
Ireland’s core executive reached a critical juncture in its management of EU business 
and a number of key structural and procedural reforms were set in train as a response 
(most notably the ‘ratcheting-up’ of interdepartmental coordination and enhanced 
Parliamentary scrutiny).  These reforms helped contribute to the success of Ireland’s 
Sixth EU Presidency from January to June 2004 and the final negotiation of the EU’s 
Constitutional Treaty under the Irish watch (Rees 2005). 
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III.  DISSECTING THE SYSTEM 
Figure 1 To Be Inserted Around Here: The Irish Core Executive6 
 
The structures of the Irish core executive that deal with EU business include: the 
ministries, committees and designated units with responsibility for managing EU 
affairs.  Given the reach of EU policies on national policy-making, every department 
and office in the Irish core executive system is required to deal with the European 
Union in some way.  The extent of interaction and need to manage EU business 
depends primarily on the degree of Europeanization found in the respective policy 
domains of each office and department.  It is possible to place the Irish core executive 
system’s management of EU business on three distinct gradations based on this 
criterion:  the Holy Trinity (the hub of EU management), the inner core and the outer 
circle. 
 
The salience of the EU in the particular policy area determines the response of the 
individual departments in setting up structures to deal with the flow of EU business.  
Three over-arching ministries – Foreign Affairs, Taoiseach and Finance – manage 
Irish EU policy from a macro perspective and are the central structural nodes through 
which Ireland’s overall EU strategy must pass through at varying stages.  These three 
departments have been referred to as the ‘holy trinity’ of Ireland’s management of EU 
business (Laffan, 2001b).  At the second level, or the inner core, EU policies are 
central or increasingly central to the work undertaken by the Departments of 
Agriculture, Justice, Enterprise, Trade & Employment and the Environment.  Given 
its responsibility for the translation of all European law into domestic law, the Office 
of the Attorney General is also included in this level.  As EU competence grew from 
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the 1980s onwards in new policy areas such as environment and internal security and 
more hands-on involvement in the formulation, coordination and monitoring of new 
legislation was necessary, some departments (namely Justice and Environment) 
moved from the outer circle to the inner core.  For the departments at the outer circle 
of core-executive management, coordinating and managing national policy remains 
the over-arching concern.  However, each of these departments, to varying degrees, 
deal with a certain amount of EU business, in particular as they have become involved 
in the Lisbon agenda.  
 
The Holy Trinity: Departments of Foreign Affairs, the Taoiseach and Finance 
The Department of Foreign Affairs assumed the role of lead department on EU 
matters from the Department of Finance in 1973.  Its place at the heart of the Irish 
core executive is still taken as given, however it now shares its co-ordinating 
responsibilities to a greater degree with the Department of the Taoiseach.  In 
September 1973, the DFA issued its main circular that that established how EU 
business should be handled (CH/177/35).  Responsibility for day-to-day co-ordination 
on EU matters was assigned to the DFA. This constituted a break with the past, as the 
Department of Finance was the lead department in the period leading up to 
membership.  Membership of the EU in 1973 had a major impact on the structure of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and was instrumental in promoting the 
modernization of the Irish Foreign Service (Keatinge 1995, p.2).  The department’s 
modernization was characterized by an increase in the number of staff in head office 
and in Irish missions abroad (See table 1).  
  
Table 1 To Be Inserted Around Here. 
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Increased resources were accompanied by internal organisational changes with the 
creation of new divisions, the reorganisation of existing ones and increased functional 
specialization at head office.  Those changes were a response to membership, the 
demands of managing a presidency and the widening scope and reach of Irish foreign 
policy.  In the late 1980s, Foreign Affairs, like all government departments, suffered a 
reduction in staff during the public sector recruitment embargo. However, concern 
about the capacity of headquarters to direct the growing diplomatic network and to 
respond to the demands of strategic policy-making led to a major internal review of its 
resources and organizational structure in 1999-2000.  The chef de file or lead unit 
arrangement was put in place in February 2002 where each unit within the 
Department has overall responsibility for particular regions or countries of the world.    
 
Within the Irish system, the DFA is the department with an overview of developments 
in the EU from an institutional and political perspective.  In addition, its embassies in 
the member states can provide information and briefing on the policy positions of the 
member states.  The Irish Representation in Brussels is a pivotal source of intelligence 
on developments in the EU and has a key function in identifying how and what 
national preferences can be promoted within the EU and in identifying the trade-offs 
that might be necessary as negotiations develop.  The EU Division coordinates 
Ireland’s approach within the EU.  The Political Division is responsible for 
international political issues and manages Ireland’s participation in the EU’s common 
foreign security policy and defence issues.  The EU Division and the Irish 
Representation in Brussels form two central nodes in the management of EU business, 
particularly in relation to pillar I as they interact with a) EU institutions, particularly 
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the Council but also the Commission and the Parliament, b) government departments 
both individually and collectively.   
 
The Taoiseach’s Department, while small in size compared to other government 
departments, is central to the conduct of EU business as it serves as the secretariat to 
the Prime Minister or Taoiseach.  Its role in the conduct of EU business has been 
considerably enhanced in recent years to the extent that it is now considered as one of 
the two ‘EU coordinating departments’ (Interview Official 62, 26.03.02).  While 
primary responsibility for the development of Ireland’s European policy on specific 
issues rests with individual Departments, the core role of the Department of the 
Taoiseach is to provide a strategic direction and focus for this European policy in 
overall terms.  The aim of those in the Department is to work in tandem with the 
relevant line departments rather than duplicate the work that is already being done.  
The relatively small size of the Department of the Taoiseach necessitates this 
approach.  The department can be brought into any set of negotiations if they become 
problematic or in the event of deep-rooted interdepartmental conflict. The tendency is 
‘to delegate and to co-ordinate as required and not to micro-manage’ (Interview 
Official 49, 12.02.02). 
 
The Department of Finance’s role in EU business increased significantly from the 
mid-1980s with the single market programme, EU structural and cohesion funds, 
taxation and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to the extent that the Department 
of Finance could now be said to have an interest in everything European for its role as 
the controller of the public finances gives it a central role in EU affairs.  It is standard 
practice that EU proposals with financial implications for the Exchequer must be 
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cleared with the Department of Finance before being approved.  The Department 
plays a major role in negotiations on taxation, where the Department of Foreign 
Affairs’ involvement is minimal.  The two Divisions centrally involved in EU 
business are the Banking, Finance and International Services Division (BFID) and the 
Budget and Economic Division (BED).  These sections have autonomy and 
responsibility for policy in respect of issues under their aegis and pull together when 
going to ECOFIN.   
 
In summary, the roles of the three departments in the core of the system are 
complementary rather than competitive. The Department of the Taoiseach brings the 
authority of the prime minister to bear on cross-cutting issues and meetings called by 
this department will always be taken seriously. Foreign Affairs brings its knowledge 
of the EU, its negotiating expertise and its knowledge of the attitudes of other member 
states to the table. These two departments are major players in all of the macro-
negotiations and have very close relations on the management of EU business. The 
Department of Finance is less involved in macro-issues to do with the development of 
the EU but is central to all aspects of economic governance.  
 
The inner core and outer circle 
Although EU business now permeates the work of all sectoral departments in some 
form, four in particular have key EU responsibilities and form part of the inner core of 
the core executive in managing EU business from home: Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment (ET&E), Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform, and Environment and Local Government.  Together, these 
departments account for a sizeable proportion of Ireland’s EU business.  Given the 
  17 
size of these departments and the salience of their responsibilities, they have a high 
degree of departmental autonomy in the exercise of their policy responsibilities.  They 
also tend to be involved in macro-negotiations on cross-cutting issues and have well-
established units or divisions devoted to EU and international affairs.  ET&E and 
Agriculture have been key players from accession, whereas Justice and Environment 
have become increasingly involved in EU business from the 1990s onwards.  The EU 
task facing each of these departments differs greatly one from the other.  Agriculture 
is a clearly defined sector with a well-organized and politically significant client 
group.  ET&E is multi-sectoral with responsibility for a wide range of policy areas 
such as regulation, trade, social and employment policy, consumer policy, research 
and certain EU funds.  Justice is managing a relatively new but rapidly changing 
policy domain, which is characterized by complex decision rules, and the UK and 
Irish opt out from Schengen and aspects of JHA.  Environment policy in Ireland is 
increasingly formulated within the European frame and environmental issues are 
touching other policy areas of government and other departments business, such as 
sustainable development, which is relevant not only for Environment but also 
Agriculture and Communications, the Marine and Natural Resources.  Ireland’s 
implementation record with regard to EU environmental legislation is closely 
monitored by a myriad of environmental lobby groups and NGOs at national and 
European level. 
 
The Office of the Attorney General is included in the inner core of governmental 
departments who manage the interface with Brussels for one primary reason - the 
Office of the Attorney General offers legal advices and legislative drafting required as 
a result of the State’s membership of the EU.  Any departmental queries on EU 
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legislation come to this office and this Office drafts every statutory instrument or 
statute produced in order to transpose EU legislation into domestic law.   
 
Departments in the inner core and outer circle differ in two ways with regard to 
structures (see figure 1).  First, the primary responsibilities of the Departments of the 
outer circle of the Irish executive continue to lie in the national arena.  Even so, such 
is the reach of the EU, particularly with the development of the open method of co-
ordination as a mode of governance, each of the departments in the outer circle finds 
itself increasingly obliged to manage EU business to varying degrees.  Each of the 
departments in the outer circle has placed staff in the permanent representation in 
Brussels.  It must also be borne in mind that the EU’s competences in policy areas 
within the remit of these departments is also relatively weak in comparison with 
policy areas covered by departments in the inner core.  Second, departments in the 
outer circle may or may not have specific divisions or units dedicated to dealing with 
EU business.  
 
Horizontal Structures   
In all of the member states, committees at different levels in the hierarchy play a 
central role in the inter-ministerial or horizontal co-ordination of EU affairs.  They are 
the main institutional devices for formal horizontal co-ordination.  Until 2001, a key 
characteristic of the Irish committee system was its institutional fluidity and 
malleability. (See Table 2 for a chronology of the differing committee devices that 
have been established in Ireland).  The Cabinet is the centre of political decision 
making in the Irish system. It processes EU issues according to the same standard 
operating procedures and rules that govern the processing of domestic issues.  
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Although under-institutionalised by continental standards, the sub-structure of the 
Irish Cabinet has been strengthened by the establishment of a series of Cabinet sub-
committees, including an EU Committee. It is attended by the key ministers with an 
EU brief, ministerial advisors, and senior civil servants.  In preparation for the 2004 
Presidency, this Committee met once every two weeks and was chaired by the 
Taoiseach.  
 
Table 2 To Be Inserted Around Here. 
 
Following the first Nice referendum defeat, the Irish committee system became 
embedded in the Irish system with formalisation of the interdepartmental coordinating 
(chaired by the Minister of State for European Affairs).  Senior Officials attend the 
Committee from each Department, as can the Permanent Representative.  The 
Committee is used as an early warning system for potentially problematic issues 
arising out of EU business, as well as a forum to facilitate strategic thinking across 
government departments.  As in the Cabinet Sub-Committee, the practice of holding 
presentations on relevant issues also takes place within the Committee.  Senior 
officials from government departments attend a number of other, generally ad hoc, 
inter-departmental committees designed to deal with specific cross-cutting issues that 
arise.   
 
Figure 2 To Be Inserted Around Here. 
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The Permanent Representation 
The Permanent Representation is an integral part of Ireland’s management of EU 
business.  It is a microcosm of Ireland’s core executive in Brussels and staff maintain 
very close links with their home departments in Dublin. Traditionally, staff numbers 
had always been small (in 1990s Ireland had the second smallest Permanent 
Representation in the EU).  However, a significant increase in staffing occurred in the 
1990s when a number of domestic ministries felt the need for a presence in Brussels.  
By the 2004 presidency staff numbered more than 140 (including military staff).  The 
incremental process of Europeanization is evident in the number of ministries that 
have a presence in the representation.  In 1973, six ministries had staff in Brussels.  A 
further three ministries joined them in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s and 
onwards the Ministries of the Marine (1991), Justice (1995), Health (1996), Attorney 
General’s Office (1999), Defence (2000), Education (2001), Arts Culture and the 
Gaeltacht (2002) were added to the list.  All domestic departments with the exception 
of the Taoiseach’s department are now represented in Brussels.  Officials at the 
representation regard servicing the Council as their core business and the cycle of 
Council, COREPER and working party business sets the tempo of work in the 
Representation (Laffan 2001a, p.289).  According to one former ambassador, ‘the 
major job of the Permanent Representative is to ask ‘is this something we can win’ 
and ‘what will I advise the Minister?’ (Interview Official 55, 07.03.02). During 
negotiations, especially those of a sensitive nature, there is continuous and high-level 
contact between Dublin departments, the DFA and Brussels on the stance Ireland 
should take.   
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IV.  PROCESSES 
In examining processes, we focus on how the structures are animated in reality, that 
is, how the system lives and the codes, rules and guidelines through which it 
undertakes business.  Ireland’s management of EU business is not highly formalised. 
There is no Bible of European Affairs either for the system as a whole or within 
individual departments. Unlike the UK system there is no tradition of putting on paper 
Guidance Notes on substantive policy issues or horizontal procedural issues (Bulmer 
and Burch 2000).  The DFA did not adopt the role of producing codes, rules and 
guidelines for the system as a whole. Such an approach would have gone against the 
deep-rooted convention of the dominance of the lead department in the Irish system.  
Contact between officials was not formalised or paper driven, with many discussions 
taking place over the phone (Laffan 2001a, p.292).  Lead departments would inform 
other departments of relevant negotiations on a need-to-know basis. There was no 
formal procedure put in place for the production and dissemination of briefing 
documents.  Nor was Ireland’s performance in implementing EU legislation tracked.  
However, the need for improved parliamentary scrutiny following the Nice ‘No’ did 
lead to the introduction of new rules and guidelines.  These are discussed in the 
section on parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
As mentioned above, the preparation of briefing material is not systematised in the 
Irish system at all levels in the hierarchy.  There is little practice of sending written 
instructions to the COREPER representatives from Dublin or of holding pre-
COREPER meetings in the national capital.  Rather, within the Representation, the 
Permanent Representative and the Deputy establish their own modus vivendi with the 
attachés concerned.  Within each department and across the system there are well-
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established standard operating procedures on how briefing material is prepared for 
Council meetings.  The central features of this are the centrality of departmental and 
divisional responsibility.  The ‘lead’ department must prepare the brief for its Minister 
for each Council meeting in their sector and within each department the ‘lead’ section 
on a particular agenda item takes responsibility for preparing briefing material for that 
issue.  The EU agenda and timetable dictates the intensity of response needed from 
the Irish system while an issue remains within the Council/European Parliament 
system.  The focus at this stage is on the projection of Irish preferences into the 
Brussels arena.  
 
Although there are no formal guidelines about report writing, the practice of reporting 
on negotiations does exist within government departments.  The DFA, Agriculture 
and Justice appear to have the most comprehensive and systematic approach to report 
writing and to the circulation of such reports within the department.  In other 
departments, individual officers appear to have more autonomy on report writing and 
the circulation of such reports can be more hit and miss.   
 
Once a law is passed or a programme agreed at the negotiating stage, the focus 
changes to the reception of the output of EU decision making into the national system.  
The Core Executive must also ensure the transposition of EC law in the Irish system.  
Individual Government departments are responsible for implementation.  When 
Ireland fails to implement or incorrectly transposes EC law, the DFA receives notice 
of infringements reasoned opinions and notice of ECJ proceedings via the 
Representation in Brussels. It then sends the relevant documentation to the Attorney 
General’s Office, the department concerned and the Chief State Solicitors Office.    
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Information Pathways 
Ireland’s administrative culture is characterised by considerable autonomy for 
individual ministries which could well militate against the sharing of information. 
However, the demands of the Brussels system require a degree of information sharing. 
In the Irish system there are formal pathways for the dissemination of information. 
The EU co-ordination section in Foreign Affairs is at the centre of the formal 
information pathway for pillar one issues.  Commission proposals and related papers 
are received by the Documentation Centre and are then distributed to the relevant 
sections within Foreign Affairs, other government Departments, and the Oireachtas 
(Houses of Parliament). All formal communications from the Commission to Ireland 
come to this section via the representation in Brussels.  The DFA clearly adopts a 
policy of the maximum sharing and distribution of information. According to a 
departmental official, ‘the over-riding approach is to get the material out’ (Interview 
Official 51, 12.02.02).  The approach of domestic ministries to the sharing and 
distribution of information depends on the departmental culture, the sensitivity of the 
issue and the degree to which a particular department wants to insulate particular 
issues from system wide discussion.  In the home departments, the most widespread 
practice is to have one unit responsible for the circulation of information but in some 
cases there are multiple information points, particularly if a department is responsible 
for more than one Council formation.  In areas with a tradition of secrecy such as  
JHA or financial affairs, the circulation of information can be more limited.  
Following the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, the 
Department of Justice handled negotiations on the European Arrest Warrant, 
informing only Foreign Affairs, the Taoiseach’s Office and the Office of the Attorney 
General of the tenor of the negotiations.  Justice was responsible for the Irish position 
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in the negotiations and the interdepartmental forum was established to share 
information on the progression of the negotiations with the other departments affected 
(Foreign Affairs, Office of the Attorney General and Taoiseach).  The Department of 
Finance can be similarly reticent.  Finance handles all ussies relating to Ireland’s 
participation in EMU and is careful to inform other departments of developments 
purely on a need-to-know basis: ‘Finance know what they are doing but don’t share 
information’ (Interview Official 56, 12.03.02).  Thus although there is considerable 
sharing of information, there are also pockets of the system where information is 
harvested and not shared.  
 
Coordination 
The co-ordination ambition depends on the nature of the issue on the Brussels agenda, 
the phase of the policy process and the national style in managing EU business.  A 
fourfold distinction between routine sectoral policy-making, major policy shaping 
decisions within sectors, cross-sectoral issues and the big bargains is apposite.  
Departments can handle the routine business of dealing with Brussels within clearly 
defined sectoral areas without engaging in too much inter-departmental consultation 
and co-ordination.  In addition, the Irish system gives individual departments 
considerable autonomy within their own sectors even on the major shaping issues 
provided the wider system is kept informed.  On the key national priorities, the Irish 
system engages in ‘selective centralization’ (Kassim 2003).  The system will channel 
political and administrative resources on the big issues.  This has occurred on a 
number of occasions when big issues demanded an inter-departmental coordinated 
response, for example, the 1983 negotiations on the reform of the Common 
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Agricultural Policy,7 the 1996 and 2004 EU Presidencies and the 1999 multi-annual 
budgetary negotiations (Agenda 2000).   
 
V.  THE AGENTS 
Participation in the activities of the European Union poses challenges to those who 
work in national civil services.  In order to live with the Brussels system, states need a 
cadre of EU specialists who can combine technical/sectoral expertise with European 
expertise.  Ireland’s EU cadre can be found in Foreign Affairs, Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, Agriculture, Finance and Justice. In all of the other departments, there 
are significant EU related posts but these are few in number.  Irish civil servants are 
expected to handle any post that they are placed in and to move to radically different 
work in the course of their careers.  It is thus exceptional in the Irish system that an 
official would work only on EU matters for their entire careers.  That said, there are a 
small number of officials whose careers are largely EU related in the diplomatic 
service and in the key EU ministries.  These are officials who might have served on 
high level EU committees for long periods and because of their EU knowledge 
become a key resource in the system.  Although they constitute an essential resource 
in the Irish system, the EU cadre may not be adequately recognised.  One senior 
official concluded that: 
 
Within the system, there is hardly any incentive to be a ‘Brussels insider’, in 
terms of finance or family commitments. There is no one central system to 
bring this about. People don’t want to be pigeonholed in that way. ...the 
weighting given in civil service [recruitment and promotion] panels to such 
skills might not be great’ (Interview Official  53, 12.02.02). 
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There is no specially trained EU cadre in the system or no EU related fast track. 
Training is ad hoc throughout the system.  Language training within the Irish system 
is also weak. Consequently EU expertise is built up on the job. 
 
The manner in which Irish officials do their homework for negotiations in Brussels 
and conduct negotiations is influenced by a number of factors.  Size matters.  The 
relatively small size of central government, coupled with the small size of the country, 
and the fact that Irish delegations tend to be smaller than those of other member states 
all influence perceptions of how the Brussels game should be played.  Irish officials 
have an acute sense of the constraints of size and work on the basis that as a small 
state; Ireland has a limited negotiating margin and should use that margin wisely.  
Irish officials try to avoid isolation in negotiations and, as one official argued, ‘Ireland 
has fewer guns, and not many bullets so it must pick its fights carefully’ (Laffan, 
2001).  The problem solving approach to negotiations means that Irish officials tend 
to intervene on specific issues and would have little to say on the broad thrust of 
policy.  Considerable attention is paid to tactics, that is, discerning the negotiating 
positions of other member states and the working out of trade offs between 
negotiating camps.8  In addition, personalism is a dominant cultural value in Ireland 
arising from late urbanisation and the small size of the country. Civil servants 
working on EU matters meet frequently in Brussels and Dublin and have an ease of 
contact. Officials throughout the system can easily identify the necessary contacts in 
other departments.   
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There are several well-entrenched norms in the Irish system that influence how EU 
issues are handled.  First, is the norm that Irish delegations should ‘sing from the 
same hymn-sheet’ and should not fight interdepartmental battles in Brussels. 
Delegations would not engage in conflict in front of other delegations. Second, there 
is a high level of collegiality within the Irish system and a high level of trust between 
officials from other departments.  This is accompanied by an understanding of 
different departmental perspectives and styles. A high level of trust is particularly 
prevalent among the EU cadre, as officials see themselves fighting for ‘Ireland Inc’. 
Third, is the norm that Ireland should be as communautaire as possible within the 
limits of particular negotiations. As stated above, Irish officials/politicians do not 
oppose for the sake of opposing. 
 
Executive-Parliamentary Relations 
Until the critical juncture of the first Nice Treaty referendum defeat in June 2001, the 
relationship between the Oireachtas and the core-executive was weak.  Relations 
between the Oireachtas and the EU had been characterized as a combination of 
neglect and ignorance (O’Halpin 1996, p.124).  On accession, a Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities was 
established as a ‘watchdog committee’.  However, its performance was modest, 
hampered as it was by limited resources and lack of interest by parliamentary deputies 
and the media in its output.  In 1993, it was reconstituted as the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on European Affairs and its primary role was to inform deputies and 
senators of general EU policy developments rather than scrutinize EU legislation as 
such. 
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The weakness or perceived absence of parliamentary scrutiny of EU business was 
highlighted as a serious problem during the 2001 Nice referendum.  In response to 
this, the government developed a new system of enhanced Oireachtas scrutiny of EU 
affairs codified in the 2002 EU Scrutiny Act.  The parliamentary link for the new 
procedures is the EU Scrutiny Sub-Committee of the Joint Oireachtas Committee for 
European Affairs.  All EU related documents are deposited in the DFA’s EU 
Coordination Unit and passed on to relevant departments to prepare briefing notes.  
These briefing notes are then transmitted to the Scrutiny sub-committee to be 
examined on a two-weekly basis.  With the help of a policy advisor, the Sub-
committee identifies EU legislative proposals that are significant enough to merit 
parliamentary scrutiny by the relevant sectoral or departmental parliamentary 
committees.  The relevant committee then produces a report on its deliberations, 
which is laid before the Oireachtas.  While the proposals make provision for extensive 
engagement between the Oireachtas, ministers and officials, a binding scrutiny 
reserve has not been put in place.  Instead, Ministers are honour bound to take the 
opinion of the relevant committee into account when negotiating in the Council of 
Ministers.  Differences of opinion have been extremely rare as a high degree of 
consensus exists between the sectoral committees and departments on issues 
((Interview Official 78 27.10.05 and Sub-Committee on European Scrutiny, Second 
Annual Report 2005).  Following the original circular on the management of EU 
business in 1973, the guidelines on Oireachtas Scrutiny are the next most significant 
formalisation of the management of EU business in Ireland.  The need for 
Government departments to prepare notes for the Oireachtas committee has ensured 
that within each department, formal systems must be put in place to ensure that such 
notes are prepared.   
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VI.  BALANCE SHEET 
The Irish approach to the management of EU business has been consistent over time 
and change when it has occurred has been gradual and incremental.  On accession in 
1973, structures and processes were firmly put in place for managing EU business 
with the Department of Foreign Affairs as interlocutor between the EU and the 
domestic.  Key features of this system included strong departmental autonomy, weak 
processes of interdepartmental coordination and a weakly institutionalised committee 
system.  The Irish officials responsible for managing the EU-domestic interface were 
small in number, and had a pragmatic, cohesive and collegial style of doing business.  
These charateristics remained virtually unchanged until the resurgence of EU 
integration in the late 1980s with the enhancement of the Department of the 
Taoiseach’s coordination role.  However, the electorate’s rejection of the Nice Treaty 
in June 2001 was the first considerable shock encountered by the Irish political and 
administrative system and led to significant systemic change.  The critical juncture 
created by the Nice ‘no’ led to increased formalisation of the structures and processes 
in place in order to manage EU business.  
 
Nice I was a major domestic shock to the system of core executive management of 
EU business in Ireland.  Until Nice I, Irish ministers and civil servants could engage 
with the EU system in the past in the context of a broad domestic consensus and 
within an enabling political environment.  Europe was not a contentious issue.  In the 
first Nice referendum the Irish government and political class miscalculated and took 
this positive support for granted.  The ‘no’ to Nice highlighted the weakness of EU 
knowledge among the Irish electorate, a degree of disinterest given the low level of 
turn-out and the emergence of a gap between the government and the Irish people on 
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Europe.  One senior official spoke of the ‘escape of gases’ after Nice (Interview 
Official 51, 28.02.02), which suggested that in place of the previous consensus there 
were a variety of views about the EU in political parties, the Cabinet and the wider 
civil society.  At the same time, the result brought the core executive’s management 
of EU business sharply into focus with the realization that the system needed to re-
engage with the EU.  This inevitably led to soul searching and questioning at political 
and official level with talk of ‘ a need to recharge the batteries on Europe, to go into a 
new mode and organize accordingly’ (Official 39, 12.02.02).  
 
The establishment of the National Forum on Europe9 helped highlight the issues at 
stake amongst the electorate in advance of the second Nice referendum and helped 
contribute to the yes vote in Nice II.  At the same time, the core executive re-engaged 
with Europe, with the formalization of EU coordination processes and the 
improvement of parliamentary-executive relations.  These reforms contributed to the 
successful sixth EU Presidency in the first half of 2004 and fed into the successful 
conclusion of negotiations on the EU’s constitutional treaty.  Once again, the Irish 
core executive was back on top, showing itself to be successful in positioning Ireland 
in the EU system and in responding to domestic challenges.   
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Table 1:  Department of Foreign Affairs Staffing 
 
Year Total Number in 
DFA 
Total Number in 
Economic/EU 
Division 
1967 40 6 
1971 51 11 
1974 87 31 
1979 114 27 
1982 130 30 
1986 136 29 
1988 125 24 
1992 123 15 
1995 126 19 
2000 175 19 






Table 2:  EU Committees in the Irish System -  
Period Committee Chair 
Pre-Accession European Communities Committee Department of Finance 
1973-84 European Communities Committee Department of Foreign Affairs 
1985-87 No meetings of the committee  
1987-90 European Communities Committee Geoghegan-Quinn (Minister of 
State) 
1988-90 Ministers and Secretaries Group Haughey (Taoiseach) 
1989-90 Ministerial Group on the Presidency Haughey (Taoiseach) 
1992-94 European Communities Committee Kitt (Minister of State) 
1994-97 European Communities Committee Mitchell (Minister of State) 
1994-1999 Ministers and Secretaries Group Bruton/Ahern (Taoiseach) 
1994-98 Senior Officials Group Department of the Taoiseach 
1998-99 Expert Technical Group Ahern (Taoiseach) 
1998- Cabinet Sub-Committee Ahern (Taoiseach) 
1998-2002 Senior Officials Group Department of the Taoiseach 
2002-2004 Interdepartmental Coordinating 
Committee on European Union 
Affairs 
Roche (Minister of State) 
2004- Interdepartmental Coordinating 
Committee on European Union 
Affairs 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The material that forms the basis of this study was gathered from an extensive series of semi-
structured interviews with those involved in managing Ireland’s EU affairs in 2000, 2002/3 and 2005 
respectively. 
2 Knill makes a distinction between the instrumentalities for managing the EU-domestic interface 
(where we do see convergence in the form of foreign ministries or prime ministers’ offices acting as 
interlocutors between the EU and the domestic) and the underlying political and administrative core of 
the national systems where divergence continues to be evident (Knill 2001, p.35-37). 
3 The 2001 referendum became known in common parlance as Nice I.  The second referendum in 
September 2002 in which the electorate voted in favour of the treaty became known as Nice II. 
4 Finance, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and External Affairs. 
5 It has been said that Irish governments agreed to projects such as economic and monetary union and 
foreign and security policy reforms in return for increased structural funds, a strategy termed 
‘conditionally integrationist’ (Scott 1994). 
6 DFA = Department of Foreign Affairs, Fin = Department of Finance, Taois = Department of the 
Taoiseach, Justice = Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Environ = Department of Environment, 
Heritage and Local Government, AG’s Office = Attorney General’s Office, ET&E = Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Agri = Department of Agriculture and Food. 
7 The so-called ‘super-levy’ negotiations where quotas were placed limiting the amount of food/milk 
etc farmers could produce in return for financial receipts. 
8 The Irish have gained a reputation for tactical thinking.  In the 2004 intergovernmental conference on 
the EU’s constitutional treaty, former UK Commissioner Chris Patten noted Taoiseach Bertie Ahern’s 
‘tactical wizardry’ in the negotiations (Patten 2005, p.128-9).   
9 The National Forum on Europe comprises of representatives from political parties, interest groups, 
non-governmental organisations and individual citizens.  From late 2001 to 2004 the Forum travelled 
throughout the country conducting public meetings and debates on EU issues. 
